During the month of October 1962, the planet veered closer toward annihilation more so than ever during modern times. This occurred after an American surveillance plane discovered the fact that Soviet nuclear weapon installations were being built in the island of Cuba, less than 160 kilometers from the United States. In response, President John F Kennedy ordered the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet to impose a maritime blockade around Cuba. The ensuing period constituted almost two weeks of unbearable anxiety.
The peril was clear. If Kennedy, or his Russian opposite, Nikita Khrushchev, had fired against the other side, a series of worldwide atomic strikes followed by counterstrikes might have followed, thrusting mankind into all-out destruction.
The October crisis has been examined repeatedly, in books, films, as well as TV documentaries. However, for its third season, a prominent BBC World Service podcast The Bomb presents a novel element into this historical narrative. The series is co-presented featuring Max Kennedy alongside Nina Khrushcheva, family members of the men who, over 13 days, held the destiny of humanity within their grasp.
"What were the Soviet side planning? What were Washington considering?" ponders Nina Khrushcheva, the Soviet leader's descendant who is also an academic of international affairs.
In her view, the unique appeal of the podcast is its endeavor to objectively ask: "Why do people hate each other to the point they confront each other?"
"It struck me how spectacular it is that individuals can be allies or else can become complete adversaries," states Kennedy, the son of RFK, nephew of the late president and now an author and attorney. "We see this dynamic over and over when nations enter into conflict, demonstrating the profound irrationality it is to fight."
What is remarkable about the Cuban missile crisis is that, because it unfolded in the global spotlight, people globally were able to observe nearly in real time while it edged towards disaster. Even so, the threat of annihilation was more imminent than what most people understood at the time.
"Virtually everyone among Kennedy's advisors were advocating for a military strike followed by an invasion," says Kennedy. "If we had attacked Cuba using the Sixth Fleet, undoubtedly the Russians stationed there would have fired a nuclear warhead against the US Sixth Fleet, which would have sunk the naval vessels and sunk America's primary naval force. And, we would have retaliated with massive retaliation which would have ended all life on Earth."
The reality this did not occur stands as credit to both leaders, who succeeded in exercise restraint while engaging in diplomacy when many advisors in their governments were advocating action. As a result, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the nuclear weapons in Cuba and Kennedy (although not reported then) removed American similar weapons from Turkey. The sense of relief was immense, matched by the sense of hope.
Still, during those 13 days of October 1962, the anxiety was felt globally. The Bomb’s co-hosts were born in the years following the crisis, and Khrushcheva being taught about it via the Soviet school curriculum, which painted an alternative narrative of what happened.
"You said your parent remembers it, and it was a frightening time," she says. "However in the Soviet Union, the public were largely unaware a great deal regarding the crisis, because it was a crisis, whereas under the Soviet system the official line was that everything was always fine and sunny."
Within the Khrushchev household, though, it was distinct. "I was informed that it was a triumphant moment for the USSR, because it represented a direct confrontation. They were able to find a solution, thus didn’t start a global war, seen as a wonderful outcome," she continues. In the years to come, though, that perspective was not shared by everybody. "For decades in Russian politics, it was considered a failure for the Soviet leader, because he didn’t blow up the United States."
This podcast is remarkably even-handed and well produced that Khrushcheva quips she nearly forgot the known the ending. This effect is, in part, due to contributions from historians. But, truly, the most momentous aspect remains the involvement of the descendants. Even within living memory, it would be unthinkable that descendants of the heads of state of America and USSR would appear together publicly. The fact that Max Kennedy and Nina Khrushcheva can do that, and be so warm toward one another, has to be a sign of optimism.
"We aren't the pioneers," smiles Khrushcheva. "After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, a relative Sergey Khrushchev’s son where he became great friends with Dwight Eisenhower’s children."
"However we were strangers prior to this project," clarifies Max. "That is a shame since we connected immediately and we’re friends, which is really great. Finally, after almost six decades since nearly annihilating the planet, our families are now allies, suggesting the world is more secure, a little bit."
Is that truly the case? Part of why The Bomb feels so necessary is because we once again are living in a perilous era. The symbolic clock of doom is closer to midnight than ever before, partly since today's statesmen appear not to have the capacity to learn
Web developer and UX designer with a passion for creating efficient grid-based layouts and modern web solutions.